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Reflections on the Evolving Jurisprudence Concerning the Presence of 
the Accused Focusing on National Commissioner of the South African 
Police Service v Southern African Human Rights Litigation Centre and 
Another 
Abstract 
On 30 October 2014 South Africa’s Constitutional Court unanimously stated that the 
South African Police Service was obligated to investigate allegations of torture in 
Zimbabwe. This landmark decision, based on South Africa’s international obligations 
and domestic legislation, is rooted in the Court’s interpretation of universal jurisdiction 
and in particular its application of the presumption of the “anticipated presence” of the 
accused.  
The case, first heard in the North Gauteng High Court in 2012 before being taken on 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal and Constitutional Court, concerned allegations 
of torture against ZANU-PF officials and Zimbabwean police during the run-up to 
elections in 2007. This final judgment imposes a binding obligation on the South African 
Police Service to investigate the allegations, prior to any decision on further 
prosecution.  
This dissertation begins by providing a background to South Africa’s implementation of 
the Rome Statute domestically before focusing on the theoretical framework of universal 
jurisdiction. This is followed by an examination of the South African jurisprudence, in 
particular the judgment of the Constitutional Court in National Commissioner of the 
South African Police Service v Southern African Human Rights Litigation Centre and 
Another.  
The Constitutional Court’s decision to allow for the exercise of universal jurisdiction in 
absentia (otherwise known as “anticipated presence”) must be located within the 
broader concept of jurisdiction. Anticipated presence is a controversial issue and this 




The fight against impunity for perpetrators of international crimes, emphasised by both 
the Rome Statute and South Africa’s own legislation, has been strengthened by this 
judgment. This paper will also examine the remaining areas of concern which were not 
addressed by the Constitutional Court.  
This Constitutional Court judgment will define the approach of South African courts in 
forthcoming cases concerning the application of the Rome Statute. Despite the 
Constitutional Court’s failure to take all factors into account in its judgment, this 
landmark decision has changed the legal landscape considerably and will be a powerful 
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With the adoption of the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002, South Africa fulfilled its obligations, as a signatory to 
the Rome Statute, by enacting complementary legislation. This legislation empowers the 
South African authorities to investigate and prosecute international crimes and s 4(3) of 
the Act provides for four bases on which the state could assume jurisdiction. One of 
these four is universal jurisdiction. Although universal jurisdiction is triggered with the 
presence of the accused, the Act did not clarify at which stage during an investigation or 
prosecution this presence was required.  
On 16 March 2008, the Southern Africa Litigation Centre (SALC) delivered a dossier 
concerning evidence of torture against Zimbabweans. As the perpetrators were also 
Zimbabwean and the crimes were allegedly committed in the territory of Zimbabwe, the 
National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) in South Africa declined to investigate this case. 
SALC took the South African Police Service (SAPS) to the North Gauteng High Court 
and won their case. The South African Police Service lost an appeal at the Supreme 
Court of Appeal before taking the case to the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional 
Court’s judgment, delivered on 30 October 2014, unequivocally states that the South 
African authorities had a duty to investigate these allegations. 
National Commissioner of the South African Police Service v Southern African Human 
Rights Litigation Centre and Another1is the first case in South Africa which focuses on 
South Africa’s responsibilities under both domestic legislation and international law to 
investigate or prosecute international crimes. Although the case is ground-breaking for a 
number of different legal reasons, this dissertation is primarily concerned with the 
Constitutional Court’s interpretation of universal jurisdiction.  
The Court was required to ascertain whether an investigation into allegations of torture 
by Zimbabweans against other Zimbabweans within that country could be initiated in 
South Africa. As the alleged perpetrators are not present in South Africa, the Court also 
                                                          
1 [2014] ZACC 30, hereafter referred to as the SALC case. 
6 
 
had to determine whether South African law should follow the liberal tradition of 
universal jurisdiction, as seen in the Pinochet case,2 or whether a strict requirement of 
presence was necessary prior to the initiation of an investigation. The recognition that an 
investigation may occur prior to the likely arrival of a perpetrator is referred to as 
“anticipated presence”.  
In order to understand the context of the Constitutional Court’s judgment, this paper will 
first outline the background to South Africa’s relationship with the International 
Criminal Court3 from the establishment of the ICC through to the adoption of 
complementary domestic legislation. This will be followed by an explanation of the 
principle of complementarity in respect of the ICC. After an inquiry into the theoretical 
aspects of universal jurisdiction, this dissertation will explore the concept of anticipated 
presence through international case law. Part A of this paper will conclude with a 
discussion of the limitations imposed on the SAPS, NPA and judiciary when 
investigating and prosecuting international crimes under South Africa’s legislation.  
Part B introduces the relevant factual details of the SALC case as well as the decisions 
taken by the North Gauteng High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal. This is 
followed by a detailed examination of the decision taken by the Constitutional Court on 
the issues of universal jurisdiction and anticipated presence. The implications of the 
Court’s judgment are potentially far-reaching and this paper includes a discussion on its 
possible repercussions in the sphere of politics as well as legal precedent. The paper 
concludes with an analysis of the new precedent set by the Constitutional Court on the 
legal point of anticipated presence. A variety of concerns are raised with respect to this 
judgment, including its impact on future cases regarding universal jurisdiction. 
However, despite some weaknesses in the Constitutional Court judgment, this paper 
finds on reflection that the judgment follows the most favourable interpretation of 
international law and domestic legislation in order to fight against impunity. The 
acceptance of “anticipated precedence” by the Constitutional Court will support South 
Africa’s commitment to investigating and prosecuting international crimes. 
                                                          
2 See Chapter 6(a): The case of Augusto Pinochet. 
3 Hereafter referred to as the ICC. 
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PART A – THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
CHAPTER ONE: South Africa and the Rome Statute 
South Africa’s support for an international court to try international crimes can be traced 
to 1993. Delegations from South Africa and a few other nations of the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) participated in the draft statute which the 
International Law Commission presented to the United Nations General Assembly’s 
Sixth Committee.4 Subsequently South Africa was closely involved in meetings 
concerning the establishment of an international criminal court prior to the Rome 
Conference. In September 1997, a conference was held in Pretoria that negotiated a 
series of principles that were adopted by the SADC nations.5 This collection of 
principles also appeared in the Dakar declaration on the ICC and was incorporated into a 
resolution of the Organisation of African Unity approved by heads of state in Burkina 
Faso in June 1998.6 
As a ‘fervent supporter of a permanent international criminal court’, South Africa was 
influential in mobilising the other SADC nations.7 South Africa coordinated the 
construction of significant parts of the final draft of the Rome Statute, particularly Part 
IV: Composition and Administration of the Court.8 The support of the SADC bloc was 
instrumental in the adoption of the Rome Statute on 18 July 1998. Delegates from the 
SADC nations had been involved in every level at the Rome Conference9 thus enabling 
the delegates to fulfil most of the SADC objectives, as set out in their common 
statement, which had served as an instruction manual for the bloc.10 The unity of the 
                                                          
4 Sivu Maqungo, ‘Establishment of the International Criminal Court: SADC’s Participation in the 
Negotiations’ (2000) 9(1) African Security Review 42. 
5 Southern African Development Community (SADC) Principles of Consensus and Negotiations, 
formulated on 14 September 1997. 
6 Hassan Jallow and Fatou Bensouda, ‘International criminal law in an African context’ in Max du Plessis 
(ed) African Guide to International Criminal Justice (2008) Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria 42. 
7 Lee Stone, ‘Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in South Africa’ in 
Chacha Murungu and Japhet Biegon (eds) Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa (2011) Pretoria 
University Law Press, Pretoria 305. 
8 Ibid. 
9 The United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court. 
10 Maqungo (note 4) at 43. 
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African states served to ‘ensure that the principles enshrined in the SADC and Dakar 
declarations were implemented to the extent possible’ at the conference.11  
Although art 13 of the common statement had encouraged ‘all SADC member States to 
sign the Statute once it [was] adopted, and implement measures for its early ratification’ 
only six of the fifteen SADC members had signed the Rome Statute within its first year, 
while currently five SADC nations are still not party to the treaty.12 Of particular interest 
to this paper is that Zimbabwe is one of these five,13 while South Africa, the primary 
focus of this paper, has signed, ratified and enacted complementary and cooperative 
legislation in accordance with the Statute. Although Zimbabwe did initially sign the 
treaty, the state has ruled out ratification and therefore is not a party to the Rome 
Statute.14 Consequently the state is protected from incurring any obligations, unless it 
chooses to accept the court as an international legal person, under the pacta tertiis rule.15 
The only exception to this rule occurs when the United Nations Security Council refers a 
situation to the International Criminal Court thereby empowering the Court to assume 
universal jurisdiction in the matter.16 
Although South Africa was one of the original signatories, ratification was delayed due 
to the need to draft complementary domestic legislation. In July 1999 diplomats and 
justice department officials from twelve of the fourteen SADC countries met in Pretoria 
for the SADC Conference on the Rome Statute.17 On the conclusion of this conference, 
a set of general principles was adopted entitled the Model-Enabling Act which ‘would 
guide the SADC approach to ratification’.18 The Model-Enabling Act deals with issues 
such as interpretation, definition of crimes, immunities and privileges of Court officials, 
cooperation with the Court, arrest and surrender of persons to the Court and enforcement 
                                                          
11 Jallow and Bensouda (note 6) at 43. 
12 As of 10 February 2015. 
13 In accordance with art 125(2) of the Rome Statute, the Statute only enters into force after a State has 
deposited an instrument of ratification or acceptance with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.  
14 New Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe rejects calls to ratify ICC treaty (25 October 2011).  
15 Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969) 1155 UNTS 331. 
16 Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute. 
17 The Democratic Republic of Congo and the Seychelles were not represented at this conference. 
18 Botswana, Report by Augustine Makgonatshotlhe, Secretary of Defence, Justice and Security (14 
September 2011) Note No. 118/11 EB 9/3/4 IX (13) B8. 
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of sentences.19 The conference’s discussions led to these guidelines providing a 
framework for SADC nations to ratify and implement the Rome Statute and were used 
by South Africa in its own implementing legislation.20 
On the conclusion of the conference, the Deputy Director-General of South Africa’s 
Department of Foreign Affairs,21 Abdul Minty, stated that although South Africa 
supported ratification of the Rome Statute this had been delayed as it was ‘a 
cumbersome document and [it] could take between six months and a year for a law to be 
passed’ in order for it be adopted into national legislation.22 This proved to be an 
optimistic estimate as ratification of the treaty only occurred with the passing of the 
Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 
2002,23 which came into effect on 16 August 2002.  
Commentators have criticised the delay in enacting this international treaty within 
domestic legislation by states such as South Africa that had initially been particularly 
vocal in support of the ICC.24 In 1999, Minty observed that since a permanent 
international court to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes had taken so long to 
establish, ‘[t]he SADC countries must not perpetuate this delay.’25 
The introduction of the ICC Act ensured that South Africa would have the ability  to 
prosecute war crimes and crimes against humanity, neither of which were the subject of 
previous domestic legislation. Prior to the ICC Act, the principle of nullum crimen sine 
lege26 would have provided an obstacle to a successful prosecution as, without domestic 
legislation specifically penalising such acts contrary to peremptory norms of customary 
international law, it would be unlawful to prosecute an individual for such a crime.27  
                                                          
19 Botswana, Report by Augustine Makgonatshotlhe, Secretary of Defence, Justice and Security (note 18). 
20 Stone (note 7) at 306. 
21 Now known as the Department of International Relations and Cooperation. 
22 Moya, Fikile-Ntsikelelo, ‘SADC backing for global criminal court’ (11 July 1999) IOLNews. 
23 Hereafter referred to as the ICC Act. 
24 Maqungo (note 4) at 42. 
25 Moya (note 22). 
26 Directly translated to ‘no crime without law’, under this principle an act may not be a crime unless 
legislated by the state. 
27 Stone (note 7) at 307. 
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Following the enactment of this domestic legislation in South Africa, the focus has now 
shifted to the practical application of South Africa’s complementary Act, in particular 
the case of National Commissioner of the South African Police Service v Southern 
African Human Rights Litigation Centre and Another.28 This case questioned South 
Africa’s obligations under the Rome Statute to investigate allegations of crimes against 
humanity in the neighbouring state of Zimbabwe. This has been a controversial case, 
particularly due to the political implications involved.29 
The case’s primary focus is jurisdiction. According to the ICC Act, South Africa has 
jurisdiction to investigate or prosecute if there is a link between South Africa and the 
crime. Section 4(3) of the ICC Act, which is discussed in detail below, lists four 
different scenarios whereupon South Africa may assume jurisdiction over an 
international crime. In the appeal, the Constitutional Court had to determine the limits of 
South African jurisdiction in the international sphere ass Zimbabwe has not ratified the 
Rome Statute, both perpetrators and victims of the crime were Zimbabwean, and the 
crime occurred in Zimbabwean territory. The Court also examined South Africa’s 
commitment to human rights and its duties under international law. As South Africa has 
enacted legislation to criminalise international crimes, as per the Rome Statute, it is 
obliged to prosecute offenders according to the aims of both the Statute and the ICC Act 
which both emphasise the determination to end impunity for crimes of this nature. The 
jurisdiction of complementary domestic courts is examined below, followed by a 
discussion on their limitations in South Africa in Chapter Seven of Part A. 
CHAPTER TWO: Complementary jurisdiction  
The ICC was not established as a court of first instance, but rather a judicial body which 
may intervene when domestic courts are unable or unwilling to act. The ICC has been 
described as a “buttress” which supports domestic criminal justice systems.30 This forms 
the basis of the principle of complementarity which is enshrined within the Rome 
                                                          
28 SALC case (note 1). 
29 See Part B Chapter 3(b): Political implications below. 
30 Max du Plessis, Antoinette Louw and Ottilia Maunganidze ‘African efforts to close the impunity gap: 
Lessons for complementarity from national and regional actions’ ISS Paper 241 (November 2012), 5. 
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Statute. This principle safeguards state sovereignty, in particular the state’s undisputed 
right ‘to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all acts committed in its territory and 
elsewhere by its citizens’.31  
The Preamble to the Rome Statute clarifies the Court’s position: 
Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective 
prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by 
enhancing international cooperation… 
Recalling that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction 
over those responsible for such crimes… 
Emphasizing that the International Criminal Court established under this Statute 
shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. [emphasis added] 
To some extent the purposes of the Rome Statute conflict with the principle of 
complementarity as the latter limits the methods through which the purposes of the 
Statute may be achieved. However, these limitations should be interpreted as a means to 
make the Statute more effective.32 As the Rome Statute expresses a preference for 
prosecutions to occur in domestic courts, rather than at the ICC, the importance of 
effective and independent national judiciaries is emphasised. This also ensures that a 
state’s sovereignty is protected from undue interference by the ICC, unless the judiciary 
is dysfunctional and unable, or unwilling, to investigate or prosecute. Therefore this 
requirement provides an incentive for states to improve and enhance their domestic 
judiciaries in order to manage international crimes at the domestic level effectively and 
protect their sovereignty.  
The Rome Statute assumes that domestic prosecutions are preferable to those in an 
international court in order to appease individual state sovereignty and in recognition of 
the ICC’s own limited capacity.33 The complementarity principle thus provides an 
                                                          
31 Stigen, Jo The Relationship between the International Criminal Court and National Jurisdictions: The 
Principle of Complementarity (2008) Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 15. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid at 18. 
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effective balance between a state’s sovereignty and the interference of the ICC.34 
Despite this, the state is ‘still under an obligation to assist and co-operate with the ICC, 
including in relation to requests for assistance with arrest or surrender.’35 
Article 17 of the Rome Statute outlines the rules of admissibility to the Court and 
explains that cases will be inadmissible if a domestic court is already investigating or 
prosecuting the issue concerned. The unwillingness or inability of a state to prosecute or 
investigate is one of the triggers for the ICC’s jurisdiction. This article affirms the ICC 
as a court of last instance with a domestic investigation and prosecution taking 
precedence unless inability or unwillingness is manifest through: a decision to shield the 
accused from justice,36 an unjustified delay in proceedings,37 proceedings which are not 
conducted in an impartial or independent manner thus inconsistent with bringing the 
accused to justice,38 the inability of the domestic judiciary to function due to a total or 
partial collapse or the inability of the State to obtain the accused or the necessary 
evidence.39  
The need to take ‘measures at the national level’,40 reiterated throughout the Rome 
Statute, is problematic in many countries where international crimes have been 
committed as their legal systems have either collapsed or been seriously weakened.41 In 
order for the principle of complementarity to be effectively implemented, national 
judiciaries require firm foundations in the rule of law and the capacity to carry out 
effective prosecutions of international crimes. Article 17(3) of the Rome Statute 
provides for the ICC to assume jurisdiction if ‘due to a total or substantial collapse or 
unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the accused or 
the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its 
                                                          
34 Xavier Philippe ‘The principles of universal jurisdiction and complementarity: how do the two 
principles intermesh?’ (June 2006) 88(862) International Review of the Red Cross 380. 
35 Lilian Chenwi ‘Universal Jurisdiction and South Africa’s perspective on the investigation of 
international crimes’ (2014) 131 SALJ 34; see also arts 86 and 87(7) of the Rome Statute. 
36 Section 17(2)(a) of the ICC Act. 
37 Section 17(2)(b) of the ICC Act. 
38 Section 17(2)(c) of the ICC Act. 
39 Section 17 (3) of the ICC Act. 
40 Preamble of the Rome Statute. 
41 Open Society Justice Initiative 2010. ‘Promoting Complementarity in Practice – Lessons from Three 
ICC Countries (7 December), 2. 
13 
 
proceedings.’42 The first priority of the State after ratification, according to art 88 of the 
Rome Statute, is to ensure that national laws are implemented. This is in order to 
facilitate Part IX which calls for the cooperation of states parties. The domestic courts 
require not only a legislative framework but also the necessary tools to facilitate 
prosecutions such as independent judges, functioning judicial infrastructure and 
investigative capacity.43 
South Africa’s ICC Act contains legislation which not only empowers South African 
officials to engage in the prosecution of ICC crimes, but also provides a comprehensive 
set of guidelines to assist South Africa in supporting the ICC through various actions. 
These include cooperating with arrest warrants, extraditing suspects, and enforcing 
sentences. Section 3 of the Act states that one of its objects is: 
[T]he enabling, as far as possible and in accordance with the principle of 
complementarity, the national prosecuting authority of the Republic to adjudicate 
in cases brought against any person accused of having committed a crime in the 
Republic and beyond the borders of the Republic in certain circumstances. 
South Africa has jurisdiction over international crimes if one of four conditions is met: 
firstly if the accused is a South African citizen,44 secondly if the accused is ordinarily a 
resident in South Africa,45 thirdly if the accused after committing the crime is present in 
South Africa46 or, finally, if the crime is committed against a South African citizen or 
resident.47 The third condition enables extra-territorial jurisdiction as the crime is 
deemed to have been committed in the country notwithstanding its actual location.48 
Section 4(3) enables South Africa to exercise universal jurisdiction over the core 
international crimes as described in the Rome Statute. 
                                                          
42 Article 17(3) of the Rome Statute. 
43 Open Society Justice Initiative 2010 (note 41) at 2-3. 
44 Section 4(3)(a) of the ICC Act. 
45 Section 4(3)(b) of the ICC Act. 
46 Section 4(3)(c) of the ICC Act. 
47 Section 4(3)(d) of the ICC Act. 
48 Stone (note 7) at 311. 
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CHAPTER THREE: Universal jurisdiction  
Mary Robinson, former President of Ireland and then United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, stated in the foreword to the 2001 Princeton 
Principles of Universal Jurisdiction that: 
The principle of universal jurisdiction is based on the notion that certain crimes 
are so harmful to international interests that states are entitled – and even obliged 
– to bring proceedings against the perpetrator, regardless of the location of the 
crime or the nationality of the perpetrator or the victim.49 
Universal jurisdiction was first invoked over the offence of piracy and under customary 
law all states have the power to punish any act of piracy committed on the high seas.50 
Unlike other crimes, no nexus, or link, with the prosecuting state was required. Later 
this concept was extended to include slave trading due to ‘the offence’s heinous nature, 
[therefore] the parties agreed to establish a common or universal jurisdiction over slave 
traders on the high seas.’51 As may be seen, universality is only applicable to serious 
crimes against international law contravening international norms erga omnes. After the 
Second World War, the universality principle was extended to war crimes and crimes 
against humanity, based in part on the premise that war crimes are often tried and 
punished in the courts of one state while occurring outside of that state against foreign 
nationals.52 
Universal jurisdiction exists for all states in respect of these particular crimes and is thus 
based on the nature of the crime. Universal jurisdiction has been justified by three 
primary rationales.53 Firstly, universal jurisdiction is seen as necessary in order to deal 
with international crimes so heinous that they affect all of humanity. Secondly, by 
allowing all states to have jurisdiction over such crimes, states have a greater capacity to 
                                                          
49 Princeton University Program in Law and Public Affairs The Princeton Principles on Universal 
Jurisdiction (2001) at 16. 
50 Kenneth C. Randall, ‘Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law’ (1988) 66 Texas Law Review 
791. 
51 Ibid at 800. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Hannah Woolaver ‘Prosecuting International Crimes in South Africa: Interpreting the Requirement of 
the Accused’s Presence in South African Territory under the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the 
ICC Act’ (2014) 131 SALJ 257. 
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fight the impunity of perpetrators. Finally, universal jurisdiction also provides a 
mechanism to ensure that the victims of international crimes may still obtain justice 
where the state is unwilling or unable to prosecute, particularly in cases where the 
perpetrators are influential non-state actors or state officials.54  
There are three aspects of a state’s jurisdiction during the process of a criminal 
investigation. Jurisdiction may be exercised prescriptively through the creation of laws 
to prohibit certain conduct, adjudicatively when the state initiates an investigation and 
starts criminal proceedings against the accused, or through enforcement.55 Enforcement 
jurisdiction, unlike the other two forms of jurisdiction, is ‘strictly and solely territorial’ 
as it is exercised by the State when arresting the suspect within its territory and, once a 
guilty verdict is reached, carrying out the applicable sentence. 56  
The Lotus57 case laid down the complementary principles of territoriality, declaring that 
states are allowed to exercise all three forms of jurisdiction within the confines of their 
territory. This case also determined whether jurisdiction extended beyond territorial 
boundaries, initially stating that ‘the first and foremost restriction imposed by 
international law upon a State is that – failing the existence of a permissive rule to the 
contrary – it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State.’58 
However, this rule was immediately qualified by the court, declaring that international 
law did not prohibit a state ‘from exercising jurisdiction in its own territory, in respect of 
any case which relates to acts which have taken place abroad and in which it cannot rely 
on some permissive rule of international law.’59 Thus the Court stated that there is ‘a 
wide measure of discretion’ which may only be limited in particular cases by prohibitive 
rules. The case concluded that unless there was a specific rule that prevented states from 
                                                          
54 Woolaver (note 53) at 257. 
55 Roger O’Keefe ‘Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept’ (2004) 3 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 735. 
56 Woolaver (note 53) at 256. 
57 The SS Lotus case (France v Turkey) (1927) PCIJ Series A, No 10. 
58 The SS Lotus case supra note 57 at 18. 
59 The SS Lotus case supra note 57 at 19. 
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doing so, states could exercise this jurisdiction over acts, including those outside of their 
territory.60  
O’Keefe finds that the distinction between adjudicative and prescriptive jurisdiction is 
unnecessary in the criminal context. He determines that adjudicative jurisdiction is 
merely the ‘exercise or actualization of prescription’ as both forms of jurisdiction are 
asserting that the conduct concerned is prohibited under the law in question.61 
Customary international law, as determined by state practice, accepts a variety of 
different bases for prescriptive jurisdiction which provide a sufficient link between the 
conduct of the accused and the interests of the prescribing state.62 Territorial jurisdiction 
is, of course, available to all states in respect of all offences. O’Keefe states that 
jurisdiction to enforce is strictly territorial as a state cannot enforce its own laws within 
the territory of another state without that state’s consent. However, in order to enforce 
territorial jurisdiction international law does not prevent ‘the prescribing state from 
requesting the extradition of a suspect, accused or convict from the territory of a state in 
which he or she is present, or from requesting other police or judicial assistance from 
another state.’63 This view was followed by the Constitutional Court in the SALC case, 
as will be discussed in Part B.64  
Concerning extra-territorial offences, the prescribing state has four different bases on 
which to criminalise conduct. The first is nationality, where nationals of a state may be 
prosecuted by that state even if the conduct was performed abroad. The second is on the 
basis of “passive personality” where the victim of the criminal conduct is a national of 
the prescribing state. The third is the “protective” principle (or competence réelle) 
which, controversially, allows states to ‘assert criminal jurisdiction over extraterritorial 
offences committed abroad by aliens where the offence is deemed to constitute a threat 
to some fundamental national interest.’65 The fourth source for jurisdiction is 
                                                          
60 The SS Lotus case supra note 57 at 18-19. 
61 O’Keefe (note 55) at 737. 
62 Ibid at 738. 
63 Ibid at 741. 
64 National Commissioner of the South African Police Service v Southern African Human Rights 
Litigation Centre and Another 2014 (2) SA 42 (SCA) at 55. 
65 O’Keefe (note 55) at 739. 
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universality pertaining to certain specific offences which do not require a link with the 
prescribing state. 
O’Keefe defines universal jurisdiction as: 
[P]rescriptive jurisdiction over offences committed abroad by persons who, at 
the time of commission, are non-resident aliens, where such offences are not 
deemed to constitute threats to the fundamental interests of the prescribing state 
or, in appropriate cases, to give rise to effects within its territory.66 
However, he then states that it is more useful to define universal jurisdiction negatively 
rather than positively and quotes Ascencio’s definition of universal jurisdiction as ‘a 
ground of jurisdiction which does not require any link or nexus with the elected 
forum’.67 Philippe outlined three essential concerns in the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction: ‘the existence of a specific ground for universal jurisdiction; a sufficiently 
clear definition of the offence and its constitutive elements; and a national means of 
enforcement’.68 
According to the Princeton Principles, serious crimes under international law include 
piracy, slavery, war crimes, crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, genocide 
and torture.69 The Rome Statute lists four crimes as within the jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court in Article 5: the crime of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression. The other crimes that are listed in the 
Princeton Principles have become jus cogens due to the widespread ratification of 
several international treaties, for example the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the 
United Nations Convention against Torture of 1984.  As this obligation to act against 
heinous crimes, irrespective of the limits of territorial jurisdiction, appears in numerous 
multilateral treaties it has become a core principle of customary international law. The 
late twentieth century thus saw the courts move away from the Lotus case as fighting 
impunity was prioritised over respecting sovereignty. These treaties also impose the 
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obligation on states of aut dedere aut judicare. This is the obligation to extradite 
individuals who commit serious international crimes or to prosecute them if no other 
state has requested their extradition.  
Universal jurisdiction has become an increasingly politicised concept as it has been 
often interpreted as a breach of a state’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. In 
particular, the African Union (AU) has raised concerns that the use of this principle by 
European states to indict African leaders ‘has the effect of destabilising or impeding the 
political and socioeconomic progress of African States.’70 The AU recognises universal 
jurisdiction as a measure to end impunity71 and its codified framework stipulates that a 
member of the AU has the right ‘to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision 
of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and 
crimes against humanity’.72 However, the AU has declared its intention not to execute 
warrants of arrest issued on this basis due to the possibility of abuse of this principle.73  
According to Brownlie, universal jurisdiction has to comply with international law and 
follow three principles: firstly, a substantial and bona fide connection between the 
subject matter and the source of the jurisdiction, secondly the principle of non-
intervention in the domestic jurisdiction of other states, and thirdly elements of 
accommodation, mutuality and proportionality should be applied.74 While the first and 
third principles have their origins in customary international law, the principle of non-
intervention in the domestic jurisdiction of states is enshrined in art 2(1) of the United 
Nations Charter.75  
The exercise of enforcement jurisdiction is confined to the territory of the state invoking 
it and the principle of non-intervention safeguards the principle of territoriality. 
However domestic criminal jurisdiction, when based on universality, applies to 
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prescriptive jurisdiction whereby states may make laws which outlaw international 
crimes, and can also apply to adjudicative jurisdiction, subject to the constraints of 
territoriality. 
According to these limitations, universal jurisdiction may be divided into two 
categories: absolute and conditional.76  
CHAPTER FOUR: “Absolute” versus “conditional” universal jurisdiction 
The subdivision of universal jurisdiction into “absolute” and “conditional” was first 
formulated by Antonio Cassese. He viewed “conditional” universal jurisdiction as the 
‘most widespread version’ which relied on the classical definition of universal 
jurisdiction.77 This was described by Abi-Saab in relation to the international crime of 
piracy,78 and focuses on the act of capture ‘in the forum deprehensionis, that provides 
the state with the competence under international law to prosecute the offender.’79 
“Absolute” universal jurisdiction, on the other hand, occurs under a different 
interpretation of the universality principle whereby ‘a State may prosecute persons 
accused of international crimes regardless […] of whether or not the accused is in 
custody in the forum state.’80 According to Jalloh, the distinction is that absolute 
universal jurisdiction allows a state to exercise jurisdiction in absentia and thus the 
presence of the accused in the territory of the state concerned is not required. 
Jurisdiction is obtained through the universality of the crime and they ‘do not need any 
of the usual territoriality, nationality or other jurisdictional nexus to the offence’.81 
Cassese states that universal jurisdiction cannot, in practical terms, be an absolute right 
of jurisdictional competence where all states are empowered to investigate and 
prosecute any and every occurrence of an international crime. Instead, although each 
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state has the potential to act as they all are empowered to act against international 
criminals, ‘universality may be asserted subject to the condition that the alleged offender 
be on the territory of the prosecuting state’.82 Practical issues such as punishment would 
be difficult to enforce without the presence of the accused in the state concerned.83 The 
ICC’s test for admissibility not only questioned whether the accused was present within 
the state wishing to exercise jurisdiction, but whether the state was able to prosecute. 
This was evident in the case concerning Saif Gaddafi where the ICC found that Libya 
was unable to prosecute as the accused was not within the state’s custody. The accused 
had been detained by Zintan Militia and the state had been unable to negotiate his 
release into their custody.84 
“Conditional” universal jurisdiction, on the other hand, relies on the presence of the 
accused in order that he or she may be available to stand trial. The presence of an 
individual accused of an international crime within the territory of the state does not 
only grant the right to prosecute, but may even infer an obligation on the state to do so.85 
This obligation may arise from the aut dedere aut judicare provision which 
accompanies universal jurisdiction in international criminal conventions. As Judges 
Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal state in the Arrest Warrant case: 
There cannot be an obligation to extradite someone you choose not to try unless 
that person is within your reach. National legislation, enacted to give effect to 
these treaties, quite naturally also may make mention of the necessity of the 
presence of the accused. These sensible realities are critical for the obligatory 
exercise of aut dedere aut prosequi jurisdiction, but cannot be interpreted a 
contrario so as to exclude a voluntary exercise of universal jurisdiction.86 
The 2005 Institut de Droit International resolution attempted to find some common 
ground between the two categories of universal jurisdiction with article 3(b): 
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Apart from acts of investigation and requests for extradition, the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction requires the presence of the alleged offender in the territory 
of the prosecuting State or on board a vessel flying its flag or an aircraft which is 
registered under its laws, or other lawful forms of control over the alleged 
offender.87 
Thus the distinction between prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction appears to allow 
states to investigate acts and request extradition under universal jurisdiction, but in order 
to exercise enforcement jurisdiction, ie to prosecute the accused, the accused must be 
present.88 Apart from a few isolated examples, which will be mentioned in Chapter Five, 
most states have limited their use of universal jurisdiction to cases where the accused is 
present in their own country.89  
CHAPTER FIVE: Anticipated presence 
The presence of the accused is therefore the pivotal point of distinction between 
“absolute” and “conditional” universal jurisdiction, while universal jurisdiction in 
absentia has become a highly contested point in international law. O’Keefe argues that 
‘there can be no such thing as “universal jurisdiction in absentia”’ as universal 
jurisdiction is one of the bases for prescriptive jurisdiction.90 Whether or not universal 
jurisdiction is lawful or not is a separate situation to whether enforcement of jurisdiction 
occurs in personam or in absentia.91 Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal noted 
in the Arrest Warrant case that: 
Some jurisdictions provide for trial in absentia; others do not. If it is said that a 
person must be within the jurisdiction at the time of the trial itself, that may be a 
prudent guarantee for the right of fair trial but has little to do with bases of 
jurisdiction recognised under international law.92 
The separate opinion in the Arrest Warrant case is rightly concerned with the 
consequences that the lack of the presence of the accused will have on a fair trial. The 
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right to a fair trial, originating in customary international law, is enshrined in art 
14(3)(d) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.93 This article 
protects the accused’s right to be present at their trial and was recognised in art 63(1) of 
the Rome Statute. The legality of proceedings occurring without the accused’s presence 
has been widely explored internationally, particularly in the Arrest Warrant case.  
The separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal in the Arrest 
Warrant case stated that: 
[T]he underlying purpose of designating certain acts as international crimes is to 
authorise a wide jurisdiction to be asserted over persons committing them, there 
is no rule of international law….which makes illegal co-operative overt acts 
designed to secure their presence within a State wishing to exercise 
jurisdiction.94  
This clearly differentiates between the investigation phase, which under international 
law does not require the presence of the accused, and the right of the accused to be 
present during trial. This infers that jurisdiction may be exercised prior to the presence 
of the accused. The Princeton Principles claim that a state is not prevented from 
‘initiating the criminal process, conducting an investigation, issuing an indictment or 
requesting extradition, when the accused is not present.’95  
If the ICC Act limits universal jurisdiction to the presence of the accused in South 
African territory, is their presence required prior to the commencement of an 
investigation? This strict interpretation of presence is not generally enforced by state 
practice and has proven to be impractical. Presence of the accused during trial is clearly 
required by the ICC Act, but the point of inquiry at which this is a requirement is less 
clear. Internationally the presence requirement has been interpreted both strictly and 
broadly in different jurisdictions.  
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CHAPTER SIX: Jurisprudence concerning anticipated presence  
a. The case of Augusto Pinochet 
The arrest and extradition of Chilean General Pinochet in 1998 was hailed globally as 
setting a precedent for a new era of universal jurisdiction displaying a broad 
interpretation of universal jurisdiction requirements. The attempt to hold the former 
Chilean dictator accountable for committing international crimes while head of state was 
believed to be a step forward in holding political leaders accountable, ‘piercing the veil 
of sovereignty’ in order to eradicate the culture of impunity.96 Although Chile had 
established its own National Commission of Truth and Reconciliation, the findings of 
the commission did not prompt any prosecutions as the Pinochet government had 
enacted an amnesty for its actions. The amnesty law was used by the Chilean courts to 
block any investigations into the criminal activities of the former government.97 This 
was challenged by the institution of a criminal investigation in Spain in 1996. This 
investigation was prompted by criminal complaints against the military leadership in 
both Argentina and Chile for their role in the disappearances of Spanish citizens.98 As 
the charges against Pinochet grew to include torture, terrorism and genocide, the 
Spanish Courts confirmed their jurisdiction in this case by referring to the universality 
of the charges. Judge Garzón also stressed that there had been Spanish victims in the 
case which leant ‘a legitimate interest’ to the Spanish proceedings.99 
On 6 November 1998, the Spanish government sent an extradition request to Britain on 
learning of Pinochet’s presence in that country. Chile’s response to this request was to 
accuse Spain of ‘an illegitimate invasion of the jurisdiction of the Chilean courts.’100 
However, it could be argued that universal jurisdiction enables the domestic courts of 
other states to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes when the national court is 
unable to shake off the shackles of past oppression. Drumbl comments that ‘[t]o be sure, 
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there are times where proceedings conducted far away can be catalysts in the process of 
accountability at home, where they may help pry loose information that is deeply 
buried.’101 
Spain had not been the only country to initiate proceedings against Pinochet. In both 
France and Belgium, criminal proceedings had been brought by French citizens in the 
former and Chilean exiles in the latter. Unlike France, the Belgian court found that 
Belgian law conferred universal jurisdiction on the courts ‘allowing it to proceed even 
when the accused is not present in the country and the victims are not Belgian in the 
setting of alleged severe violations of international humanitarian law.’102 The Belgian 
court also found that even though crimes against humanity were not codified in their 
domestic criminal law at the time, they were still able to issue an arrest warrant finding 
that ‘before being codified in a treaty or statute, the prohibition on crimes against 
humanity was part of customary international law and international jus cogens, and this 
norm imposes itself imperatively and erga omnes on our domestic legal order.’103 
Despite this resolution, the case for trial in Belgium was not presented to the British 
courts. Falk reflects on what approach should be taken with regard to a multiplicity of 
requests for extradition and whether time, which was seen as the priority in this affair, 
should be afforded primary significance.104 This case relied on the domestic courts of 
foreign jurisdictions, in this case Britain, accepting the doctrine of universal jurisdiction.  
b. The effect of the Pinochet case in Spain 
Spain had several procedural advantages for those wishing to pursue a case based on 
universal jurisdiction. For example, Spanish law not only allowed a victim to bring a 
complaint directly to a magistrate, but allowed people who were not directly connected 
to the crime to file complaints such as Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).105 The 
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successful extradition of Pinochet to Spain prompted a number of other cases against 
heads of state. Although those against currently active heads of state were dismissed on 
immunity grounds, other cases, in particular those concerning Guatemala, appeared 
promising.106 The Guatemala Genocide case was dismissed by a lower court on the 
ground of lack of jurisdiction due to subsidiarity.107 However, the Spanish Supreme 
Court overturned part of this judgment before introducing limitations to Spain’s 
universal jurisdiction law. The court held that it was necessary to have ‘a clear tie to 
Spain’ such as the nationality of the victim, or the presence of the offender within the 
country.108 In this case, the genocide and terrorism charges were thus invalid, but the 
torture charges would remain as the Convention against Torture109 allows for 
jurisdiction based on passive personality. 
The case was referred to Spain’s Constitutional Tribunal which subsequently overturned 
much of the Supreme Court’s findings. The tight nexus required for universal 
jurisdiction cases under the Supreme Court was reversed as the Constitutional Tribunal 
issued ‘a ringing endorsement of broad universal jurisdiction.’110 The Tribunal found 
that it would be contrary to the Spanish Constitution to restrict the constitutional right to 
effective judicial protection.111 The Guatemala Genocide case in 2005 established that 
an investigation on the basis of universal jurisdiction was not required to wait on the 
presence of the accused,112 although the presence of the defendant was required for 
trial,113 as ‘universal jurisdiction, whose aim is fighting impunity, does not require any 
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link other than the universal character of the values protected by the provisions 
criminalising the most serious violations of international law.’114 
c. The case of Fulgence Niyonteze 
One of the earliest cases involving universal jurisdiction in recent times concerns the 
1999 case of former Rwandan mayor, Fulgence Niyonteze.115 Niyonteze had applied for 
political asylum in Switzerland and was living in that country with his family. Based on 
information supplied to the Swiss government by an NGO, Niyonteze was detained. He 
was later charged under the Swiss Military Penal Code with murder, incitement to 
commit murder and violations of the laws and customs of war, as well as for war crimes 
under Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and art 4(2)(a) of Additional 
Protocol II.116 Switzerland refused to extradite him to the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, and instead prosecuted him in a Swiss Military Court.117 
Switzerland’s investigation took two years and involved flying witnesses to Switzerland 
and the court to Rwanda. One of the military judges wrote that: 
This investigation and everything that had to be done to prepare and organise the 
trial has demonstrated that it is perfectly possible to make investigations 
focusing on countries other than our own, to listen to victims and to see that they 
obtain justice. It is even a duty that we have towards those who have lived 
through dramatic events. The judicial intervention in such cases is also a warning 
to war criminals of all kinds, who should not or no longer be able [sic] to settle 
with impunity in the country of their choice.118 
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The Court convicted him of murder, attempted murder and breach of international 
conventions.119 The case went on appeal to the Military Appeals Tribunal which 
reversed all the lower court’s convictions on jurisdictional grounds, except for the 
convictions for war crimes which had been based on universal jurisdiction.120 Swiss 
military law allows for tribunals to exercise universal jurisdiction over individuals who 
are accused of war crimes. Although this rule was enacted in 1927, Niyonteze was only 
the second case.121 Prior to this case, the accused in In re G was charged with war 
offences in 1997 during the Bosnian conflict; but he was acquitted due to lack of 
evidence.122  
d. Belgium and universality 
Belgium’s Universal Jurisdiction Act of 1999 was a radical piece of legislation for two 
reasons. The prosecution could charge individuals who were not physically present on 
Belgian soil, while no nexus was required between Belgium and the person charged. 
The Act also disregarded the generally accepted immunity for heads of state that are 
currently in office.123 The 2001 conviction of four Rwandans on charges of crimes 
against humanity was only the second time that a third-party State has convicted 
individuals of war crimes ‘which do not directly affect the prosecuting State.’124 
Although the Rwandans were arrested in Belgium, their crimes had been committed in 
Rwanda against Rwandans.  
The liberalism of the Universal Jurisdiction Act led to a flood of lawsuits filed against 
international figures. In 2001, a case was brought against Prime Minister Ariel Sharon 
of Israel on allegations that he played a role in massacres that had occurred in Beirut. 
This case proved to be politically embarrassing for Belgium, as Sharon refused to visit 
Brussels in fear of an indictment and arrest.125 Belgium was also taken to the 
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International Court of Justice (ICJ) over the arrest warrant that it issued for Abdoulaye 
Yerodia Ndombasi, acting Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, for inciting genocide. The ICJ ruled that, as a former minister, Ndombasi was 
immune from prosecution for crimes which had been allegedly committed during his 
time of office.126 The Belgian authorities decided that judicial reform was necessary, 
prompted by the ‘perceived theoretical problems of overlap and potential conflicts with 
sovereignty’ coloured by political pressure. 127 Thus due to the combined political 
pressure and criticism by the ICJ, Belgium withdrew the Universal Jurisdiction Act in 
2003.128  
Despite the withdrawal of the Act, on 29 June 2005 a jury in Belgium convicted two 
Rwandan businessmen of aiding and abetting war crimes.129 This conviction rests on 
legislation that enables Belgian courts ‘to prosecute certain extraordinary international 
crimes committed outside Belgium where the accused is a resident of Belgium.’130 
e. The case of Hissène Habré 
In January 2000, torture victims from Chad travelled to Senegal to initiate criminal 
proceedings against former president and dictator, Hissène Habré. The state prosecutor 
brought the case to a regional tribunal in Dakar on 3 February 2000. This case, and the 
arrest of Habré, was the first time that an African country brought human rights charges 
against another nation’s head of state, as well as the first use of the “Pinochet precedent” 
outside of Europe.131  
Habré had been living in Dakar since being deposed in December 1990, although he did 
not apply for asylum but appeared to enjoy the status of guest of the government.132 
Despite a truth commission in Chad recommending in 1993 that the government ‘begin 
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without delay judicial process against those responsible for this horrible genocide, guilty 
of crimes against humanity’,133 the Commission of Inquiry was ignored until 1998 when 
the Chadian government considered requesting Habré’s extradition from Senegal.134 
After the Chadian government elected not to extradite Habré, victims, supported by 
international NGOs, filed a criminal complaint. Once the victims had given testimony, 
the judge indicted Habré on charges of being an accomplice to torture.135 A criminal 
investigation was opened with a view to further indictments against other perpetrators.  
The Senegalese prosecution claimed that they had jurisdiction due to articles 4-7 of the 
Convention against Torture, art 79 of the Senegalese constitution and rules of customary 
international law.136 Habré contested this charge and filed a motion to dismiss the case. 
The Appellate Court found in his favour stating that Senegal had not adopted legislation 
which would implement the provisions of the Convention against Torture in order that 
its courts would have jurisdiction over torture committed by a foreigner outside of their 
territory.137 The court found that the legislation had provisions for jurisdiction to 
prescribe, but not for jurisdiction to adjudicate.138 An appeal to the Supreme Court 
found that ‘Senegalese courts do not have jurisdiction over acts of torture committed by 
a foreigner outside of the territory [of Senegal], whatever the nationality of the 
victims.’139 Although the Convention against Torture established the duty to extradite or 
punish (aut dedere aut judicare),140 the Court concluded that this was a non-self-
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executing duty and found that ‘Hissène Habré’s presence in Senegal cannot by itself 
justify prosecution against him.’141 
Unlike the SALC case, anticipated presence was not an issue as the perpetrator was in 
the country that wished to prosecute the crime. However, the Senegalese interpretation 
of its obligations under the Convention against Torture stifled this attempt to create a 
“Pinochet precedent” in Africa.142 The case undermined global efforts to hold 
perpetrators accountable for heinous crimes and reinforced the culture of impunity, 
particularly in Africa.  
f. Germany and Donald Rumsfeld 
In Germany the Code of Crimes against International Law (Völkerstrafgesetzbuch), 
when read in conjunction with the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung), 
provides for universal jurisdiction in absentia, provided the presence of the suspect 
could be anticipated. This codification of the principle of anticipated presence ensures 
that Germany has one of the more liberal universality provisions globally.143 The 
German legislation also included subsidiary universal jurisdiction, in accordance with 
art 17 of the Rome Statute, allowing the state to relinquish prosecution where another 
state has a greater claim to do so. This implementation of the complementarity principle 
within German domestic legislation unfortunately gave horizontal effect to it meaning 
that if another state was currently investigating or prosecuting a case (or had already 
done so) Germany would be prevented from doing so. Consequently, when the Abu 
Ghraib situation was referred to court,144 it led to the incorrect application of art 14 of 
the Rome Statute by a German judge.145  The judge stated that the situation had already 
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been dealt with in the United States and thus, according to art 17 of the Rome Statute, it 
was not admissible in Germany.146  
Although, as Ryngaert states, ‘there are powerful arguments against this method’ if a 
critical number of states believe that the complementarity principle may be applied on a 
horizontal level ‘it may crystallize as a norm of customary international law irrespective 
of the normative desirability of such as a norm.’147 
The case was also judged inadmissible, as it did not meet the requirements for 
anticipated presence. When the Stuttgart Regional Appeals Court dismissed the appeal 
in 2009, the Court stated that:  
Contrary to the view of the complainants, however, the expectation of a 
suspect’s future sojourn in the country cannot be simply based on the fact that it 
cannot be ruled out. A sojourn in the country can only be expected if actual 
circumstances exist that suggest a presence in Germany within the foreseeable 
future.148 
This judgment provided guidelines for the use of anticipated presence in universality 
cases. One of the accused was Donald Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense, and 
despite allegations that he was regularly present in Germany for conferences and 
meetings, this was not deemed sufficient evidence of a link between Germany and the 
accused. The court concluded that the examples offered either lacked a domestic link or 
were unsubstantiated.149 This case’s conclusions on anticipated presence were 
significant in shaping an approach towards investigating notable individuals.  
g. Strict requirement of presence 
A number of states require the accused’s presence prior to initiating an investigation. In 
Denmark, the accused must be present in order for a universal-jurisdiction based 
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investigation to take place.150 If the accused departs the country at any stage during the 
investigation, the investigation will immediately end.151 An example of this occurred in 
2005 when Danish authorities received a complaint concerning a Chinese official who 
was scheduled to visit. Due to the strict presence requirement, an investigation could 
only begin on the official’s arrival, and so there were only five days during the official’s 
stay in which to investigate the complaint and apply for an arrest warrant. On the 
official’s departure the investigation had to be discontinued.152 This strict interpretation 
of universal jurisdiction hinders Denmark’s ability to deal with allegations of 
international crimes committed by foreign perpetrators.  
h. South Africa and customary international law 
The presence requirement is one which must be balanced between the generally 
recognised right of the accused to be present during their trial153 and the necessity, 
expressed in the Preamble of the Rome Statute, to end impunity for international crimes 
which is facilitated by universal jurisdiction and the prosecution of perpetrators in 
domestic courts.154 Article 3(b) of the 2005 Resolution of the Institut de Droit 
International stated that the accused’s presence is required to exercise universal 
jurisdiction except for acts of investigation and requests for extradition,155 while the 
AU’s Draft Model National Law on Universal Criminal Jurisdiction only requires the 
accused’s presence during the trial.156 State practice appears to support the view that the 
presence of the accused is not required for an initial investigation to be opened as ‘only 
a very small number of states explicitly required the accused’s presence to authorise an 
investigation.’157 Under s 232 of South Africa’s Constitution,158 customary international 
law is automatically law in South Africa unless it conflicts with South African 
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legislation or the Constitution. However, without an international treaty on the nature of 
universal jurisdiction and only limited examples of state practice so far, ‘there is at this 
point no clear rule of customary international law’ on the issue.159  
As mentioned above, under South Africa’s ICC Act one of the triggers for jurisdiction is 
the presence of the accused in South Africa after committing the crime.160 Du Plessis 
calls s 4(3)(c) ‘a particularly progressive feature of the ICC Act’161 as this extension of 
jurisdiction disregards the accused’s nationality or residence and does not require a close 
or substantial connection with South Africa at the time of the offence. As the ICC Act 
concerns crimes which fall under the universality principle, s 4(3)(c) relies on universal 
jurisdiction so no nexus with the prosecuting state is required.  
Du Plessis explains that the ICC Act provides South Africa with an “opportunity” to act 
because of universal jurisdiction, however this is limited by the phrase ‘present in the 
territory of the Republic’162 and accordingly the Act adopted a form of conditional 
universal jurisdiction which is ‘contingent upon the presence of the suspect in the forum 
state’.163 
Gevers refutes this by claiming that a more accurate interpretation is that s 4(3)(c) 
‘merely confirms the territorial limits of South Africa’s enforcement jurisdiction and 
recognises that under South African law our courts cannot hold trials in absentia’.164 
South Africa still retains universal jurisdiction over its prescriptive capabilities and these 
are not conditional on the presence of the accused on South African territory after the 
commission of a crime. The ICC Act therefore regulates South Africa’s obligations 
under universal jurisdiction165 for the presence of the accused on South African soil is 
required in order to prosecute. Chenwi agrees with this explanation, also interpreting 
                                                          
159 Woolaver (note 53) at 264. 
160 Section 4(3)(c) of the ICC Act. 
161 Du Plessis (note 79) at 4. 
162 Section 4(3)(c) of the ICC Act. 
163 Du Plessis (note 79) at 4. 
164 Gevers, ‘South Africa Litigation Centre & Another v National Director of Public Prosecutions & 
Others’ (2013) 130(2) South African Law Journal 295. 
165 Du Plessis (note 79) at 4. 
34 
 
South Africa’s s 4(3)(c) to be solely concerned with prosecution and stating that 
universal jurisdiction in absentia is ‘explicitly prohibited by the Act.’166 
South Africa’s ICC Act also appears to define jurisdiction arising from the presence of 
the accused in South Africa ‘after the commission of the crime’.167 However s 4(3)(c) is 
unclear on when the accused is required to be present in South Africa during the process 
of investigation and prosecution. This ambiguity is of paramount significance in the 
SALC case. 
Du Plessis identifies two reasons which appear to support the interpretation that a 
suspect is not required to be physically present in the forum deprehensionis in order for 
an investigation to be initiated, or for an arrest warrant to be issued in anticipation of 
arrival.168 Firstly, it is practical for an initial investigation to ascertain the current 
location of the accused. Thus it would be illogical to refuse to investigate when the 
accused’s status is uncertain.  
Whether or not expressed, the condition of presence must be presumed for the 
purposes of the “search”, during the course of which it will be verified. 
Otherwise it is a vicious circle: in order to know whether X is in hiding on our 
territory, it is necessary to search for him; but in order to search for him, it is 
necessary to have already discovered (by enlightenment or intuition) that he is 
present.169 
Secondly, as jurisdiction is based on the location of the accused and not the other 
circumstances of the case, it would be impractical if the state could only ‘open an 
investigation to the point at which it can be proven that a suspect is within the territory 
of the state exercising universal jurisdiction’.170 An investigation without the presence of 
the accused would deter international criminals from travelling to the country or at least 
alert authorities to the incoming presence of a suspect. Without such measures, South 
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Africa would run the risk of becoming a safe haven for international criminals.171 
However, the presence of the accused would still be required before the initiation of 
more advanced judicial proceedings in order to prevent the duplication of prosecutions 
for the same offence in multiple jurisdictions.172 Trials in absentia are prohibited under 
South Africa’s Constitution in order to protect the accused’s right to a fair trial.173  
The legal threshold of anticipated presence as a precondition for opening an 
investigation appears to avoid the potential legal and practical difficulties identified. 
This threshold also facilitates the interpretation of the ICC Act in accordance with the 
Rome Statute without being hindered by the strict presence requirement. Under s 233 of 
the Constitution, a court will prefer a reasonable interpretation of legislation that is 
consistent with international law to any alternative that is inconsistent with international 
law. As the Princeton Principles confirm, there is no international requirement for the 
presence of a suspect prior to the instigation of an investigation. Therefore the 
anticipated presence requirement would be acceptable as a means to give effect to the 
intention of parliament, expressed in the ICC Act, whose aim is ‘to ensure that domestic 
prosecutions of international criminals take place in South Africa.’174 
CHAPTER SEVEN: Infrastructure of the ICC Act  
At first glance, South Africa’s obligations under the Rome Statute, enforced by the ICC 
Act, appear to empower the South African authorities to investigate and prosecute all 
allegations of international crimes. However, this would be unfeasible and place an 
extraordinary burden on the police, prosecuting authorities and the judiciary.175 
Therefore limitations were placed on the prosecution and investigation of international 
crimes by the South African authorities. These were instituted by the rules governing 
criminal procedure in South Africa, the Constitution and South Africa’s ICC Act, as 
well as international instruments. 
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Woolaver proposes that the principle of subsidiarity of universal jurisdiction be applied 
in order to lessen this burden. The principle of subsidiarity states that the national court 
of first instance should be situated in the state with the closest link to the crime.176 
Therefore South Africa’s obligation to investigate and prosecute would only be 
exercised if there was no other state with a closer link. This principle is recognised as a 
method of resolving competing jurisdictions.  
The temporal scope of the ICC Act limits the prosecution of crimes to those occurring 
after the act came into force in 2002.177 The principle of nullum crimen sine lege (no 
crime without law) is internationally accepted and South Africa’s own Constitution 
prohibits the retrospective application of criminal law in s 35(3)(l). The case of Masiya v 
Director of Public Prosecutions178 confirmed the Constitutional Court’s approach to the 
principle of legality by stating that ‘[s]ection 35(3)(l) of the Constitution confirms a 
long-standing principle of the common law that provides that accused persons may not 
be convicted of offences where the conduct for which they are charged did not constitute 
an offence at the time it was committed.’179 However, this is not limited to only national 
crimes as this section states that the right to a fair trial of the accused includes the right 
‘not to be convicted for an act or omission that was not an offence under either national 
or international law at the time it was committed or omitted’.180  
International law is included as a source of law within the Constitution by s 232, which 
declares that customary international law will be respected provided that it is not 
inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament. Section 233 requires the 
courts to interpret legislation consistently with international law, while s 39 (1)(b) states 
that the Bill of Rights must be interpreted with due consideration of international law. 
Thus the extension of the ICC Act ‘to crimes under customary international law that 
took place before the Act came into force would not violate this principle [of nullum 
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crimen sine lege]’181 and would be compliant with the above sections of the 
Constitution.   
South Africa is a party to a number of international treaties and conventions which also 
impose obligations on states parties to adopt national legislation to criminalise specific 
crimes and to prosecute offenders. Once South Africa has implemented the necessary 
steps to ratify an international treaty, then the state is bound to comply. These steps are 
outlined by both the treaty and by S 231 of the Constitution. For example, the 1949 
Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Protocols became legally binding when the 
Implementation of the Geneva Conventions Act 12 of 2002 was adopted.  
In order to investigate and prosecute the crimes contemplated in the ICC Act, the 
Priority Crimes Litigation Unit (PCLU) was established within the National Prosecuting 
Authority (NPA) in 2003.182 All requests for investigations and prosecutions in 
reference to the Act must be made to the PCLU. A special National Director of Public 
Prosecutions183 is appointed to head this unit in accordance with s 13(1)(c) of the NPA 
Act184 which states that the president may appoint Directors of Public Prosecutions ‘to 
exercise certain powers, carry out certain duties and perform certain functions’.185 The 
ICC Act states that no prosecution may begin against an accused without the consent of 
a Director of Public Prosecutions. Therefore the NDPP who heads the PCLU is 
responsible for consenting, or refusing permission, to all prosecutions of international 
crimes in South Africa.186 
As the NDPP of the PCLU exercises prosecutorial discretion concerning crimes under 
the ICC Act, this discretion may be limited by three factors identified by du Plessis.187 
The NDPP should first consider the aims of the ICC Act. The primary aim of the Act is 
to ensure the prosecution of individuals who are alleged to be guilty of crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and genocides. South Africa is therefore under an obligation to 
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investigate and, if a prima facie case is established, to prosecute in order to fight 
impunity. Under s 3(d), the ICC Act must: 
[E]nable, as far as possible and in accordance with the principle of 
complementarity […] the national prosecuting authority of the Republic to 
prosecute and the High Courts of the Republic to adjudicate in cases brought 
against any person accused of having committed a crime in the Republic and 
beyond the borders of the Republic in certain circumstances.188 
The second consideration for the NDPP is that if he or she declines to prosecute under 
the ICC Act, comprehensive reasons for this decision must be provided to the Director-
General of Justice and Constitutional Development and these must be forwarded to the 
Registrar of the International Criminal Court.189 
The final factor for consideration, raised by du Plessis, is compliance with the NPA Act 
and the NPA Prosecution Policy. According to the Preamble of this Act, South Africa’s 
NPA is required to observe the United Nations Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors190 
where paragraph 15 is particularly relevant:  
Prosecutors shall give due attention to the prosecution of crimes committed by 
public officials, particularly […] grave violations of human rights and other 
crimes recognised by international law and, where authorised by law or 
consistent with local practice, the investigation of such offences.191 
The formation of the PCLU created an organisation to investigate and prosecute these 
crimes domestically and provides the framework for compliance with the Guidelines. 
The only limitation which qualifies the powers and practice of the PCLU and NDPP in 
investigating and prosecuting these crimes is the question of public interest.192 When 
considering whether it would be in the public’s interest to prosecute, the NPA’s 
prosecution policy states that prosecutors should consider all relevant facts which 
include: 
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- The seriousness of the offence, taking into account the effect of the crime on 
the victim, the manner in which it was committed, the motivation for the act 
and the relationship between the accused and the victim. 
- The nature of the offence, its prevalence and recurrence, and its effect on 
public order and morale. 
- The economic impact of the offence on the community, its threat to people or 
damage to public property, and its effect on the peace of mind and sense of 
security of the public.193 
The international crimes listed under the ICC Act are heinous in nature and thus have a 
cumulative effect on peace and security; therefore it would be logical to presume that 
there ‘must be compelling reasons of public interest to forestall or prevent such action 
by the prosecuting arm of government’.194 The primary concerns of the PCLU should be 
the gravity of these international crimes, accompanied by their universal condemnation, 
the international community’s commitment to punish those who act with impunity and 
South Africa’s interest in not becoming a safe haven to fugitives from justice.195 The 
Constitutional Court emphasised that ‘only the most compelling reasons’ would justify 
the exercise of discretion to refuse to instigate charges: 
Given the extreme gravity of the charges and the powerful national and 
international need to have these issues properly adjudicated, particularly in the 
light of the international consensus on the normative desirability of prosecuting 
war criminals.196 
The procedural limitation to prosecution, that is the consent or refusal by the NDPP, 
does not bar prosecution as per s 5(6) of the ICC Act. The consent of the NDPP is also 
limited to prosecution and is not required for an investigation.197 The lack of consent by 
the NDPP for an investigation shall be explored with reference to the SALC case in Part 
B.  
As has been stated above, the ICC Act gives effect to the complementarity framework in 
order to facilitate national prosecutions. Section 5 of the Act sets out the procedure for 
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the establishment of proceedings in South African courts, in particular s 5(1) states that 
no prosecution may be initiated without the consent of the NDPP. The Director’s 
decision must be informed with reference to ‘South Africa’s obligation in the first 
instance, under the principle of complementarity in the Rome Statute, to exercise 
jurisdiction over and to prosecute persons accused of having committed an ICC 
crime’.198 This limitation, however, is reserved for prosecution as consent is not required 
for opening an investigation, issuing a warrant, arresting the accused and charging them 
for an offence.199  
In conclusion, South Africa’s ICC Act is ambiguous on the issue of “anticipated 
presence”. The international case law has shown that although a liberal interpretation 
was initially embraced, stricter guidelines have been introduced in recent years. 
However, as no consistent approach has been accepted worldwide, the interpretation on 
this point within customary international law still vague. Part B, concerning South 
Africa’s own jurisprudence on this issue, outlines the facts and judgment of the SALC 
case. The Constitutional Court examined when the presence of the accused was required 
under South Africa’s ICC Act by looking at the legal theories examined in Part A, 
above, as well as South Africa’s obligations under international law.  
PART B – SOUTH AFRICAN JURISPRUDENCE 
CHAPTER ONE: Factual background to the SALC case 
On 16 March 2008, the Southern Africa Litigation Centre (SALC) delivered a dossier of 
evidence relating to allegations of torture that had been committed against members of 
the political opposition party in Zimbabwe, the Movement for Democratic Change 
(MDC), during a raid by the ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union – 
Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), on their headquarters, Harvest House in Harare in March 
2007. At this raid, more than 100 people were taken into custody and were detained for 
several days. During this time they were allegedly tortured by Zimbabwean police. The 
dossier contained allegations of ‘severe beatings, mock executions, waterboarding, and 
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electric shocks’ as well as pressure to implicate both themselves and others in carrying 
out petrol bombings which the ruling party had alleged that the opposition had 
committed.200 This raid occurred a year before national elections in Zimbabwe and 
relates to an alleged widespread and systematic attack on opposition members201 and 
supporters in the run-up to the 2008 national elections.202  
The dossier of evidence contained sworn witness statements of which seventeen 
deponents attested to suffering torture, while the other six were made by lawyers, 
medical doctors and family members of victims to corroborate the allegations of torture. 
SALC was concerned about the perception that the rule of law had collapsed in 
Zimbabwe, that the victims would not remain safe, and that the Zimbabwean courts 
would be unable to hold the perpetrators accountable.203 It is for these reasons that 
SALC delivered the dossier to the PCLU of the NPA in South Africa.  
SALC also submitted a comprehensive memorandum containing ‘detailed legal and 
factual submissions providing guidelines on the prosecution of crimes against humanity 
such as torture’.204 The memorandum required that the NPA consider the legal details as 
well as the evidence contained within, in order to ascertain whether to initiate an 
investigation under South Africa’s ICC Act. SALC also offered its assistance to the 
NPA for the gathering of further evidence and the provision of advice concerning 
international law in respect of the acts alleged against the named perpetrators.205 
SALC’s submission was made to the NPA as South Africa’s law enforcement agencies 
are legally obliged under the ICC Act to investigate international crimes and to hold 
these perpetrators accountable in South African courts. Although not all forms and 
instances of torture constitute crimes against humanity, ‘it was undisputed that if the 
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allegations in this case are proved, the conduct of the Zimbabwean police officers could 
amount to crimes against humanity and thus an international crime’.206  
SALC’s submission was not only concerned with the conduct of the Zimbabwean police 
but also their superiors in the police force and in government according to the doctrine 
of ‘command responsibility’. The memorandum relies on the definition of this doctrine 
as determined by the International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia:  
As long as a supervisor has effective control over subordinates, to the extent that 
he can prevent them from committing crimes or punish them after they 
committed the crimes, he would be held responsible for the commission of the 
crimes if he failed to exercise such abilities of control.207 
SALC did not attempt to bring the torture complaints to the Zimbabwean law-
enforcement agencies, however, it was accepted during legal proceedings in South 
Africa that the case should be ‘conducted throughout on the basis that the Zimbabwean 
authorities have failed to act on the torture allegations’.208 The dossier listed the names 
of several Zimbabwean officials as suspects. SALC’s founding affidavit in the North 
Gauteng High Court included reports by reputable human rights organisations which not 
only confirmed the allegations of widespread and systematic torture but also 
demonstrated that perpetrators were not being prosecuted and were acting without 
restraint.209 These statements were not denied by the South African Police Service 
(SAPS) but, rather, were dismissed as inadmissible evidence. The Constitutional Court 
found that due to the lack of denial by the SAPS there was sufficient evidence ‘to form 
the ineluctable conclusion that the Zimbabwean authorities have failed to act on the 
torture allegations’.210 
SALC received a response from the Acting NDPP, Advocate Mpshe SC, more than 
eight months after the submission of the torture docket. The response stated that the 
allegations had to be evaluated by the SAPS before the NPA could make a decision 
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whether to launch an investigation. The matter was referred to the acting National 
Commissioner of the SAPS, Tim Williams. SALC made a request to all parties involved 
that a decision be made by 30 January 2009. On 20 April 2009, SALC sent a further 
letter to the above parties as well as the Director-General of the Department of Justice 
and Constitutional Development. The extended deadline of 1 May 2009 was not met, 
and on 19 June 2009 the NDPP informed SALC that he had been advised by the acting 
National Commissioner of the SAPS that the SAPS did not intend to investigate the 
allegations.  
The reasons furnished by the SAPS for their refusal to investigate were endorsed by the 
NDPP. These reasons include lack of an adequate investigation into the matter, and that 
further investigations would be ‘impractical, legally questionable and virtually 
impossible’.211 The letter sent by the acting National Commissioner of the SAPS states 
that ‘the docket contains nothing more than mere allegations’ and that he did not see that 
he should ‘[involve] the SAPS in an investigation, the legality of which is questionable 
and which can have far-reaching implications for the [SAPS] and the country in 
general.’212 
SALC and the Zimbabwe Exiles Forum (ZEF) applied to the North Gauteng High Court 
for an order reviewing and setting aside the decision by the SAPS and NPA not to 
investigate. This was the first case in South Africa to question the application of the ICC 
Act. The case interrogated the limits of the universality principle as well as the 
obligation to investigate serious human rights violations. After losing the case in the 
North Gauteng High Court, the SAPS appealed the judgment in the Supreme Court of 
Appeal and the Constitutional Court.  
CHAPTER TWO: Final judgment on the SALC case 
The SALC case is a pivotal case on several points of law and highlights South Africa’s 
role in supporting both the ICC, through complementarity, and the Rome Statute. The 
South African courts consistently emphasised South Africa’s obligation to prohibit 
                                                          




individuals the protection to ‘act with impunity’ in committing serious breaches of 
international law. The judgment of the North Gauteng High Court focused on three 
important aspects: first, the question of the applicants’ standing, secondly the 
reviewability of the decision not to investigate, and thirdly, the duty of South African 
authorities to investigate allegations of crimes against humanity in Zimbabwe.213 The 
High Court held that the decision by the NPA and SAPS not to investigate the matter 
was inconsistent with both the Constitution and South Africa’s international law 
obligations. Judge Fabricius found that the ICC Act ‘committed South Africa, as a 
member of the international community, to bringing persons to justice under South 
African law where possible’ and concluded that: 
[A]ll the mentioned provisions place an obligation on South Africa to comply 
with its obligations to investigate and prosecute, crimes against humanity within 
the ambit of the provisions of s 4(3) of the ICC Act, and it is in the public 
interest that the State does so.214 
The High Court’s judgment also emphasised that s 4(3) of the ICC Act referred to the 
accused’s presence during a trial. The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) agreed with this 
interpretation of s 4(3), although the SCA failed to specify exactly when the accused’s 
presence was necessary. The judgment did provide some preliminary guidelines to the 
use of anticipated presence which were developed further by the Constitutional Court. 
For example the practicality of an investigation would hinge on the likelihood of the 
accused’s presence for ‘if there is no prospect of a perpetrator ever being within a 
country, no purpose would be served by initiating an investigation.’215  
Nevertheless the SCA granted the SAPS leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court. The 
constitutional issue raised was the extent to which s 205(3) of the Constitution imposed 
a duty on the SAPS and the NPA to investigate the allegations in this particular case.216 
The National Commissioner of the SAPS disagreed with the Supreme Court of Appeal’s 
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judgment on three grounds: that the court had adopted ‘an absolutist position on 
universal jurisdiction’, that the court granted relief to the defendant that had not been 
sought, and that the court ‘predetermined the manner in which the SAPS is required to 
exercise its investigatory discretion.’217 The legal question that the Constitutional Court 
had to answer was whether, considering national and international law obligations, the 
SAPS had a duty to investigate crimes against humanity beyond South Africa’s border, 
and if so at what point or in what circumstances would this duty be triggered.218 
a. Universal jurisdiction  
The Constitutional Court first determined the position of international law within South 
Africa’s legal framework by referring to the Constitution, in particular ss 231(4),219 
232220 and 233.221 In the case of Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 
and others,222 Ngcobo CJ stated that the Constitution had made it clear that South 
Africa’s legislation and Constitution should be ‘interpreted to comply with international 
law, in particular international human rights law’.223 In this case the international law 
concerned had been domesticated through the adoption of the ICC Act and the 
Prevention and Combating of Torture of Persons Act 13.224  
The Court then examined South Africa’s ability to exercise jurisdiction. The Court 
referred to O’Keefe’s interpretation of international law as consisting of three levels: 
prescriptive, adjudicative and enforcement jurisdiction. According to the Lotus case, all 
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three forms of jurisdiction may be exercised within the territory of the state.225 Domestic 
criminal jurisdiction recognises four grounds for rationes jurisdictionis: nationality, 
passive personality, the protective principle and universal jurisdiction.226 The Rome 
Statute lists the grounds for jurisdiction as territoriality or nationality in art 12(2)227 but 
does not have jurisdiction on the basis of universality.  
As has been discussed in Part A, universal jurisdiction has been supported by state 
practice in international law, yet there are certain principles which provide boundaries 
for this practice, in particular Brownlie’s three general principles.228 Enforcement 
jurisdiction is only possible within the confines of the territory of the state seeking to 
prosecute an individual, however both of the other forms of jurisdiction (adjudicative 
and prescriptive) are only limited by the principle of non-intervention which protects the 
principle of territoriality.229 
b. Principle of Subsidiarity 
Zimbabwe has primary jurisdiction over allegations of torture within its borders by its 
citizens against other Zimbabweans. But the Constitutional Court stated that as the 
dossier was brought to the attention of the South African authorities without any attempt 
to request the Zimbabwean police to investigate should not deter the South African 
authorities from their investigation. However this statement is controversial as, 
according to the Rome Statute, the ICC Prosecutor must inform states parties that would 
normally exercise jurisdiction prior to initiating an investigation.230 Stigen queries 
whether this obligation extends to domestic jurisdictions under the principle of 
subsidiarity.231 In the Arrest Warrant case, judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal 
stated in their separate opinion that a ‘State contemplating bringing criminal charges 
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based on universal jurisdiction must first offer to the national State of the prospective 
accused person the opportunity itself to act upon the charges concerned.’232 This appears 
to contradict the judgment of the Constitutional Court directly and has consequences for 
the principle of subsidiarity. It is notable that some countries have implemented 
domestic legislation to deal with the issue of subsidiarity. In Spain, for example, the law 
developed to include the principle of subsidiarity whereby the state where the crime was 
committed is favoured over a claim by Spain which is based on universal jurisdiction.233 
The issue of concurrent jurisdictions and competing claims will be examined more 
closely in Chapter Three. 
c. Obligation to investigate or prosecute 
On the issue of complementarity, the Court emphasised that the ICC is a court of last 
resort and that states parties have a primary responsibility to investigate and prosecute. 
All parties to the Rome Statute are informed that ‘it is the duty of every State to exercise 
its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes’ in order that 
impunity for these perpetrators may end.234 The Constitutional Court also emphasised 
that the ICC’s stance against impunity for universal jurisdiction allows the investigation 
of crimes committed in non-signatory countries.235 
The Court then examined South Africa’s jurisdiction to prosecute these particular 
allegations. Torture is a statutory crime because it is criminalised in South Africa’s ICC 
Act.236 This Act allows for the prosecution of a crime which occurred beyond the 
borders of South Africa.237 The international ban on torture is a peremptory norm and 
South Africa has its own Torture Act, the Prevention and Combating of Torture of 
Persons Act which domesticated the 1984 United Nations Convention against 
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Torture.238 The Court also referred to regional law, in particular the African Charter on 
Human and People’s Rights239 which was signed and ratified by both South Africa and 
Zimbabwe, as well as legal principles adopted by SADC and non-binding resolutions of 
the United Nations.  
The nature of human rights treaties to impose obligations on states parties differentiates 
them from other ordinary treaties. These obligations are referred to as erga omnes for 
they are owed to the international community as a whole.240 South Africa’s obligations 
under international law should therefore be of paramount importance as they are owed 
to all other states parties who have an interest in upholding such treaties.  
The Court concluded that due to the Constitution, the international nature of the crime of 
torture, and the multitude of international and regional treaties on this issue, South 
Africa ‘is required, where appropriate, to exercise universal jurisdiction in relation to 
these crimes as they offend against the human conscience and our international and 
domestic law obligations.241 
d. Anticipated presence? 
The Court’s final focus was the requirement for the presence of the accused. The Court 
referred to the Constitution where in s 35(3)(e) an accused is required to be present 
during trial but there is no requirement for the presence of the accused during an 
investigation. According to the Supreme Court of Appeal, “anticipated presence” in 
South Africa was sufficient to comply with the principles, as stated by Brownlie, that 
‘there should be a substantial and bona fide connection between the subject-matter and 
the source of the jurisdiction.’242 The SAPS argued that the suspect’s presence was 
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required before an investigation could be initiated in order to prevent a multiplicity of 
investigations or prosecutions of any international crime by a range of states.  
The Constitutional Court focused on whether presence was required at the point of the 
investigation. The 2005 Resolution of the Institut de Droit International states that an 
accused’s presence was required when exercising universal jurisdiction ‘apart from acts 
of investigation and requests for extradition’.243 Part V of the Rome Statute, which deals 
with the investigation and prosecution process, distinguishes between the two when 
dealing with the issue of the presence of the accused. Numerous mentions are made of 
the need to request the presence of the accused, inter alia, art 54 where the Prosecutor 
may ‘request the presence of and question persons being investigated, victims and 
witnesses’.244 
The Supreme Court of Appeal judged that although the ICC Act did not ‘expressly 
authorise an investigation prior to the presence of the alleged perpetrator within South 
African territory, it also does not prohibit such an investigation.’245 Therefore, an 
investigation was not contemplated in the legislation and no necessary measures were 
indicated. The Court read the ICC Act in conjunction with other legislation and found 
that ‘the SAPS, in the form of the Hawks, has the competence to initiate an investigation 
into conduct criminalised in terms of the Act which had been committed extra-
territorially.’246 
The Constitutional Court agreed with the Supreme Court of Appeal’s decision that an 
investigation may occur in the absence of a suspect. The Court made several arguments 
that, while not in support of anticipated presence, appear to find that any requirement for 
the presence of the accused prior to, or as a precondition for, an investigation would 
render the process unworkable. For example, it would be ludicrous for the presence of 
the accused to be required before an investigation into the location of the accused could 
                                                          
243 Institut de Droit International (note 87). 
244 Article 54(3)(3) of the Rome Statute. 
245 National Commissioner of the South African Police Service v Southern African Human Rights 




occur. The Court also determined that an anticipatory investigation did not infringe on 
the constitutional rights of the accused to a fair trial.247 
CHAPTER THREE: Conclusions by the Constitutional Court 
The Court did however provide a set of guidelines or limitations on the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction. The first limitation is the principle of subsidiarity, which declares 
that the other country must be unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute, that there 
is a substantial connection between the subject matter and the source of jurisdiction, and 
the prohibition of intervention in another country.248 The second limitation is 
practicability as a preliminary investigation must examine whether a successful 
prosecution would be likely by testing reasonableness, the ease of gathering evidence, 
and the nature and extent of resources. Geographic proximity should also play a role in 
determining the practicality of an investigation.249 
a. Admissibility 
The Constitutional Court’s guidelines on the exercise of universal jurisdiction provide a 
practical framework for the application of anticipated presence with two limitations. 
These limitations are practicability and the principle of subsidiarity as noted above. Like 
the International Criminal Court, the principle of subsidiarity allows South Africa to 
step in when the other country is unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute. It is 
unclear what threshold will be used to establish this, although the Katanga case 
established the admissibility test under art 17(1)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute and 
could be used as a persuasive source for a definition.250 The principle also states that 
there must be a substantial connection between the source of jurisdiction and the subject 
matter, in addition to non-intervention in the domestic affairs of the other country.  
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There are no guidelines within either the Rome Statute or South Africa’s ICC Act to 
provide for a situation where the state with primary jurisdiction, due to a change in 
capacity, is able to assume jurisdiction in a case where an investigation or prosecution is 
already underway in another state. Although Zimbabwe has not ratified the Rome 
Statute or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it is bound by the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights251 among other regional documents and 
non-binding United Nations resolutions. Article 5 of the Charter protects the rights of 
citizens to dignity and to be free from torture and other degrading treatment. This right 
imposes the correlating obligation on Zimbabwe to investigate allegations of torture.252  
Should Zimbabwe decide to investigate the allegations would South Africa’s ability to 
investigate be halted? It appears to depend on the requirements of admissibility: 
unwillingness or inability. The Rome Statute emphasises the principle of ne bis in idem 
in art 20 stating that ‘no person who has been tried by another court for conduct’ which 
is also listed within the Statute ‘shall be tried by the Court with respect to the same 
conduct’. The proviso is that the initial prosecution should not have taken place with the 
purpose of shielding the perpetrator from justice, or if the proceedings ‘were not 
conducted independently or impartially in accordance with the norms of due process 
recognised by international law’ or were ‘inconsistent with an intent to bring the person 
concerned to justice.’253  
If the principle of subsidiarity was followed then Zimbabwe, as the state with the closest 
link to the crime, would have the strongest claim. The competing claims of two 
domestic jurisdictions over prosecuting or investigating such a crime have not been 
examined in any great detail. Article 19 of the Rome Statute refers to a challenge by a 
state on admissibility or jurisdiction which may be brought by a state which also has 
jurisdiction. There is no rule in international law which establishes a hierarchy of the 
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various sources of jurisdiction.254 Rastan summarizes a variety of reasons both for and 
against prosecution in the country where the crime occurred; however he concludes that 
‘[t]he silence of the Rome Statute on which domestic jurisdiction should be granted 
priority when there are competing admissibility challenges means that the issue is likely 
to be treated on a case by case base.’255 
The Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
declared in 2005 that there should be no predetermined hierarchy between domestic 
jurisdictions concerning the transfer of cases under rule 11 bis proceedings. The Appeals 
Chamber observed that attempts to resolve this issue and establish criteria for the most 
appropriate jurisdiction between ‘concurrent jurisdictions on a horizontal level’ had 
hitherto failed and that ‘[i]nstead, States have agreed on various criteria and opted to 
give weight to certain criteria over others depending on the circumstances of a particular 
case.’256 The Chamber concluded that a decision on applicability should be based on 
pragmatic considerations and an evaluation of which State would have the ‘significantly 
greater nexus’.257 
In 2003 Eurojust, the European Union’s judicial cooperation body, published a series of 
guidelines for cross-border cases where there was a distinct possibility of prosecution 
occurring in two or more jurisdictions.258 These may be of some interest to South Africa 
and other jurisdictions in reference to horizontal claims. However, the conclusion one 
may reach on conflicting domestic jurisdictional claims is that the determining factors 
will be a comparison of the nexus between the crime and the competing states, as well 
as pragmatic considerations.259 
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As the Constitutional Court states, ‘if Zimbabwe were able and willing to investigate 
and prosecute the alleged crimes of torture, there would be no place for South Africa 
also to do so.’260 The SALC case alleges the involvement of six Cabinet Ministers and 
Directors General as well as the ZANU-PF; but a future change in the political 
landscape could lead to a judiciary that may fulfil the requirements for functional 
independence and impartiality.  
The practicability limitation requires a preliminary investigation to answer whether a 
full investigation would be likely to lead to a successful prosecution. The preliminary 
stage will check reasonableness, how easily the prosecution may collect evidence, the 
extent of resources available and the geographic proximity. In the SALC case it is clear 
that geographic proximity is a high priority concern. The case concerns a neighbouring 
country which has significant links with South Africa. It has been evident that political 
unrest has had implications on Zimbabwe’s neighbouring states, and in particular, South 
Africa, as attested by the number of Zimbabwean refugees seeking asylum in South 
Africa. States would thus be in favour of investigating allegations of international 
crimes on their borders as not to do so may lead to instability.  
b. Political implications 
The judgment of the Constitutional Court does not only affect the legalities of 
interpreting the ICC Act or the decision by the Court that the SAPS was bound to 
consider investigating the case. Zimbabwe is one of South Africa’s neighbours, as well 
as a fellow member of SADC, and there are close ties between the two countries. During 
the case, there was pressure exerted on South Africa by Zimbabwe who was refuting the 
claims. One of the SAPS’s arguments in the case had focused on the harm to the 
relationship between the two countries. The Constitutional Court emphatically dismissed 
this as unavoidable and described torturers as the enemy of all.261  
This follows the dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert in the Arrest 
Warrant case stating that ‘[i]t may be politically inconvenient to have such a wide 
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jurisdiction because it is not conducive to international relations and national public 
opinion may not approve of trials against foreigners for crimes committed abroad.’262 
However, Van den Wyngaert concluded that trials based on universal jurisdiction could 
not be deemed illegal due to political inconvenience.263  
The SAPS’s concerns over interfering with the sovereignty of a foreign state during an 
investigation were noted by the Constitutional Court. But the SAPS’s reference to the 
offer of assistance by SALC as a proposal to conduct “espionage” in Zimbabwe on 
behalf of the SAPS was pronounced to be ‘wholly untenable’.264 The Court found that 
‘there is nothing improper or unlawful in a non-governmental entity facilitating foreign 
nationals travelling to and lawfully entering into this country to aid a lawful 
investigation’.265 The Constitutional Court was highly critical of the Zimbabwean 
authorities and judicial system throughout the judgment. Although the Court did not go 
so far as to state that the reasons offered by SALC for bringing the case to the South 
African courts, namely that ‘there were several indications of the collapse of the rule of 
law in Zimbabwe and that the safety of the witnesses in Zimbabwe could not be 
guaranteed’266 were true, their conclusion that ‘it was very unlikely that the 
Zimbabwean police would have pursued the investigation with the necessary zeal’267 
was not complimentary. 
This conclusion has rather interesting political ramifications as Zimbabwe, a fellow 
member of SADC, has been supported by the South African government throughout the 
turbulent economic and political situation of recent years. In particular, the South 
African government has shown support for the ruling party and the leadership of Robert 
Mugabe, as seen in 2013 when President Jacob Zuma censored the South African envoy, 
Lindiwe Zulu, and endorsed the ZANU-PF’s landslide victory in the national election 
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‘despite widespread accounts of electoral irregularities’.268 The South African judiciary, 
although following the guidance of the ICC Act in fighting impunity on the African 
continent, is showing support, although indirectly, to opponents of the current 
Zimbabwean government who would be travelling to South Africa in order to give 
testimony against the current Zimbabwean regime. Although the judgment stated that an 
investigation would not offend the principle of non-intervention, the Court does not 
appear to take into account the affect that an investigation would have on Zimbabwe’s 
current political situation and the legitimacy of its government.  
The Constitutional Court’s support of civil society involvement in facilitating the 
transport of Zimbabwean victims and witnesses to South Africa appears to be 
considering the fact that the investigation is ‘one into a crime as grave and heinous in 
international law as torture.’269 This leads one to suppose that the actions of SALC may 
be less justifiable if it concerned a different, less serious crime or type of investigation. 
South Africa’s policy on investigations highlights the need to respect state sovereignty 
according to the International Co-operation in Criminal Matters Act.270 Under this Act 
South Africa is required to make a formal request for assistance to Zimbabwe. 
Zimbabwe is not a party to the Convention against Torture or the Rome Statute so 
‘South Africa is therefore dependent on political will to bring those accused of the acts 
of torture to justice’271 so Zimbabwe would have grounds to refuse the request. 
South Africa’s ICC Act has now been displayed as an effective tool to combat impunity 
in the region, and may lead to further claims relating to other African nations in the 
SADC region or possibly further afield. These claims will however be limited by the 
Constitutional Court judgment’s emphasis on the practicability of investigating 
allegations. Van den Wyngaert’s dissenting opinion also referred to practicality, 
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particularly in reference to the difficulty of obtaining evidence in other states and a fear 
of overburdening the court system.272 
These guidelines on practicality will likely prove invaluable in avoiding the kinds of 
problematic situations that occurred in Belgium and Spain where the lack of clear 
limitations from the onset led to a gradual decrease in the applicability of universal 
jurisdiction. In both of these states political pressure was exerted on the courts. 
Belgium’s prosecutors currently have broad discretion on universal jurisdiction cases 
but these individuals are not protected from political pressure.273 South Africa’s courts, 
particularly those involved in the SALC case, have shown admirable strength in 
withstanding political pressure and have complied with their commitment to justice 
regardless of the wishes and views of other branches of government. 
c. Legal conclusions 
The conclusion of the Constitutional Court was that the SAPS had misconceived their 
legal obligations under the ICC Act and that the merits of the case were sufficient to 
conclude that there was a reasonable possibility that the SAPS could gather evidence to 
satisfy elements of the crime of torture.274 The case provided a legal framework to guide 
the application of anticipated presence and set out guidelines on the interpretation of 
South Africa’s ICC Act. The Constitutional Court’s decision that an investigation may 
proceed without the presence of the accused follows considerable international state 
practice and interprets s 4(3) of the ICC Act in accordance with the aims of both the Act 
and the Rome Statute. Under universal jurisdiction, South Africa could assert 
prescriptive and, to a certain extent with respect to territoriality, adjudicative jurisdiction 
in order to investigate the allegations of torture ‘as a precursor to taking a possible next 
step against the alleged perpetrators such as a prosecution or an extradition request.’275  
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The Constitutional Court highlighted how this interpretation would benefit the fight 
against impunity. Du Plessis noted that impunity gaps exist where the ICC lacks 
jurisdiction or where there is an absence of political will. Political considerations play a 
role in case selection by the ICC Prosecutor, as well as the decisions on referral by the 
United Nations Security Council.276 Consequently a ‘horizontal complementary 
relationship between the ICC and national justice systems’277 would lessen the impunity 
gap. Through the adoption of universal jurisdiction and, in particular, anticipated 
presence, national courts have been able to investigate and prosecute cases that 
otherwise would not have received attention due to politics.  
With the addition of anticipated presence in the arsenal of prosecutors and investigators, 
cases concerning international crimes outside of South Africa’s borders are now more 
readily accepted under the purview of South African courts – provided they comply with 
the guidelines suggested in the SALC case. Investigations without the presence of the 
suspect are not new but investigations into the conduct of non-citizens committed 
against other non-citizens in a foreign country’s territory initially appeared to stretch the 
limits of South Africa’s legal jurisdiction. However, the Constitutional Court’s emphasis 
on South Africa’s obligations under international law as well as South Africa’s vision to 
advance the cause of human rights globally (and particularly on the African continent) 
favours this extension of universal jurisdiction over perpetrators of international crimes 
residing in foreign states.  
This judgment will not only affect the likelihood of an investigation and prosecution of 
Zimbabweans for acts of torture committed against their fellow citizens. The support by 
the Constitutional Court for anticipated presence as an aspect of universal jurisdiction 
will encourage and facilitate other investigations and prosecutions into international 
crimes such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. This precedent 
should serve to lessen the impunity of perpetrators predominantly in the SADC region 
but also across Africa. 
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Finally, this case provides a precedent on important legal issues which will influence 
several ongoing investigations and forthcoming cases in the South African courts 
concerning the ICC Act. The court found that there was a distinction between 
enforcement and prescriptive jurisdiction with relation to the accused in absentia. 
Therefore the South African judiciary would be unable to exercise jurisdiction without 
the presence of the accused, but an investigation may be undertaken if there is 
anticipation of their presence.278 
In 2009, the Solidarity Alliance and the Media Review Network submitted a dossier to 
the NPA and the Priority Crimes Unit alleging that Israeli soldiers who fought in 
Operation Cast Lead in Gaza were guilty of international crimes.279 The dossier states 
that South Africans were among the soldiers implicated and that, although Israel is not a 
party to the Rome Statute, South Africa would have jurisdiction to investigate its own 
citizen’s conduct abroad under the ICC Act. The NPA declined to prosecute, but the 
case is currently under review in the North Gauteng High Court.280 
It is worth noting that the NPA has opened one investigation into international crimes 
under the ICC Act. It found that sufficient evidence was brought to the attention of the 
PCLU to warrant opening an investigation into crimes against humanity committed in 
Madagascar in 2009. When the investigation was begun in August 2012, the basis was 
the ICC Act and universal jurisdiction. Unlike the SALC case, jurisdiction was found 
under s 4(3)(c) of the ICC Act281 as the accused, former President Marc Ravalomanana, 
was in exile in South Africa. The status of this investigation is unknown as 
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Ravalomamana managed to evade surveillance to return to Madagascar in 2014282 and is 
currently under house arrest.283 
Another example of a case that will be affected by the SALC case concerns politically 
motivated rape. In February 2013, AIDS-Free World made legal submissions to the 
NPA requesting that the SAPS investigate allegations of a widespread campaign of 
politically motivated rape carried out in Zimbabwe by members of the ZANU-PF 
against opposition party supporters in 2008. This case shares many similarities to the 
SALC case and the Constitutional Court’s pronouncements on universal jurisdiction and 
anticipated presence should prove invaluable.  
The Constitutional Court’s clarity on the issue of the applicability of the ICC Act to 
crimes committed by foreign nationals in a foreign territory against non-South Africans 
provides a framework which would potentially protect South Africa’s courts from 
‘delictual claims of state responsibility made by other states whose international legal 
rights are violated by internationally unlawful assertions of jurisdiction.’284 This case 
will also provide much-needed guidance concerning the interpretation of South Africa’s 
ICC Act. 
Conclusion 
After viewing South Africa’s relationship with the Rome Statute, this paper outlined the 
legal theories concerning the principle of complementarity and universal jurisdiction. 
The concept of “anticipated presence” was examined through exploring various cases 
which presented the argument that the initial liberal interpretation of universal 
jurisdiction has been, to some extent, undermined in more recent years. The golden 
years of the “Pinochet precedent” were quickly eroded by political pressures, and the 
requirements for jurisdiction to investigate or prosecute international crimes became 
stricter. The concept has not been rejected by international law; however its popularity 
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has diminished with the introduction of new domestic legislation to govern the 
application of the principle.  
Once South Africa’s infrastructure concerning the ICC Act was explained, the facts of 
the SALC case were presented. The NPA’s refusal to investigate the matter was initially 
based on the practicalities involved, as well as a concern that the case would lead to a 
negative impact on diplomatic relations between South Africa and Zimbabwe. The 
appeal by the SAPS queried the extent of the duty imposed on it to investigate the 
allegations. 
This paper traced the legal background of the principles espoused in National 
Commissioner of the South African Police Service v Southern African Human Rights 
Litigation Centre and Another, before concentrating on other similar cases 
internationally. The second half of this paper focused on an analysis of the 
Constitutional Court’s reasoning. The judgment was well-balanced and relied on the 
works of a variety of academic scholars such as Brownlie and O’Keefe, as well as 
international cases, for example the Lotus case and the Arrest Warrant case.  
The Constitutional Court judgment in the SALC case provided a definitive answer on the 
use of “anticipated presence” in cases concerning the ICC Act. The SALC case has been 
a test case of both South Africa’s ICC Act and its obligations to the Rome Statute and 
has provided guidelines and limitations on the legal questions of anticipated presence, 
the principle of complementarity and universal jurisdiction. South African authorities 
cannot be expected to investigate all allegations of international crimes and so the 
Constitutional Court provided workable guidelines on how to determine the feasibility 
and reasonableness of an investigation and prosecution.  
The case sets out a definitive framework for the practical application of the ICC Act 
with regard to an investigation based on universal jurisdiction. The interpretation of 
South Africa’s obligations and rights regarding universal jurisdiction must comply with 
both the Constitution and customary international law. The Constitutional Court 
accepted the concept of “anticipated presence” into South Africa’s jurisprudence after 
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discussing at length the theories of universal jurisdiction and jus cogens. This sound 
theoretical base should be beneficial in future prosecutions based on universal 
jurisdiction, in South Africa and internationally. South Africa’s role in safeguarding 
democracy and human rights was strictly construed in this case, and consequently the 
SAPS was ordered to investigate the allegations. 
Although the Constitutional Court’s judgment is a well-reasoned one and interprets a 
wide range of legal theories regarding jurisdiction, there were gaps in the judgment 
relating to competing jurisdictions and the absence of any attempt to initiate a case on 
these allegations in Zimbabwe. Indeed the Court failed to anticipate any possible effects 
on the political situation within Zimbabwe that may arise should a prosecution occur. 
The Court chose instead to take the moral high ground, which is admirable but not 
always pragmatic in the political arena. Any prosecution of Zimbabweans for 
politically-motivated torture would inevitably have ramifications for the ruling party 
and, consequently, ‘a relatively high political cost for the forum state.’285 However, this 
paper also acknowledges that South Africa must honour its commitments both 
internationally and domestically as laid out in legislation and the Constitution.  
The Constitutional Court’s framework on the application of the ICC Act complied with 
many of the arguments for limitations on the concept of “anticipated presence” and 
followed the liberal opinio juris concerning the subject. The SALC case has created the 
precedent for universal jurisdiction in South Africa. Further cases will, I am sure, further 
clarify the issues I have raised; however, the guidelines established by the Constitutional 
Court in this case will successfully support the initiation of investigations and the 
prosecution of international crimes in South Africa on the basis of universal jurisdiction. 
In conclusion, this landmark judgment has surely paved the way for South Africa to join 
the fight against impunity on the African continent.  
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